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1 Introduction
In the past decades, labor economists have accumulated evidente  that is at odds
with the hypothesis that the labor market is a standard competitive market. Wage
regressions show that employer size, i.e. the number of employees of the firm or  es-
tablishment, bas  a positive effect on the wage (Brown and Medoff (1989)),  and that
there are persistent differences between the wages in different industries (Krueger
and Summers (1988)). These effects remain, if an extensive list of controls  for pro-
ductive differences between workers is included in the regression. Moreover, these
results have been replicated for many countries.
In the same period another literature has emerged that stresses  the importante
of labor market flows (Mortensen (1986), Blanchard and Diamond  (1989)),  e.g.
flows to and from unemployment and job-to-job transitions. The size  of these flows
is assumed to be affected  by the behavior of employers and employees, who  make
their decisions with incomplete knowledge of the opportunities in the market. The
discovery of these opportunities is modelled as the outcome of a random  process,
i.e. random  from the point of view of the individual employer or  employee. The
resulting delays are referred to as search frictions. There are various types of search
models, that differ in the search technology of the agents, allowance for aggregate
supply and demand  effects, and the nature  of uncertainty. The standard job search
model assumes that (un)employed individuals search randomly among firms, that
they take aggregate supply and demand  conditions as given, and that they are un-
certain on both the location of employment opportunities and on the terms of these
opportunities, in particular the wage. The job search model has inspired empirical
research on unemployment and job spells. This research focuses  on variations in
search frictions and the role of choice in transitions between labor market positions
(Devine and Kiefer (1991) give a survey).
More recently, attempts have been made to integrate the two strands of research
in labor economics. The impetus came  from difficulties that arose in obtaining vari-
ation  in the terms of employment as an equilibrium outcome (Diamond  (1971)).
The standard job search model is a model of labor supply, and the distribution that
describes the uncertainty on the terms of employment is exogenous to this model.
Hence, research started to make the determination of the terms of employment en-
dogenous  to the model. A number of such  models are now available (Albrecht and
Axel1 (1984),  Mortensen (1990),  Burdett and Mortensen (1996)). We shall refer to
these models as equilibrium search models. Equilibrium search models are consis-
tent with the observed anomalies in wage determination. In these models a firm can
have a larger workforce by offering wages that are higher than those of other firms.
Moreover, search frictions prevent the equalization of wages and profits among in-
dustries, and inefficient firms can  survive by paying low wages. In explaining the
anomalies equilibrium search models do not invoke special behavioral assumptions
that are difficult to test directly, as required by e.g. efficiency wage models.
Some of the theoretical models have been used in empirical studies (Eckstein and
Wolpin (1990),  Van den Berg and Ridder (1993)). A partial survey can  be found
in Ridder and Van den Berg (1996). Th’is  research is facilitated by the availability
of panel data on labor market histories and the relatively modest computational
effort that is needed to solve these theoretical models. Moreover, if we maintain
the hypothesis that firms maximize their long-run profit  rate, the parameters of the
model can  be estimated from observed labor market histories. Data on firms are not
needed, although they would allow US to test and relax some of the assumptions on
employer behavior.
The resulting models have policy implications that sometimes differ from those
derived from the standard competitive model. We consider the effect of changes  in
the leve1 of unemployment benefits and in the leve1 of the minimum wage. The stan-
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dard job search model predicts that an increase in unemployment benefits raises the
reservation wage of the unemployed and as a consequente  lengthens unemployment
spells and raises the leve1 of unemployment. This argument ignores the fact that
employers may change their wage offers in reaction to a change in the reservation
wage. If employers set wages, they wil1 make their wage offer equal to some reser-
vation  wage. Hence, if firms make positive profits, they may  react  to an increase in
the benefit  leve1 by increasing their wage offers leaving unemployment unaffected.
Recent proposals to lower the benefit  level, or equivalently to lower taxes on wages
but not on unemployment benefits, in order to decresse  reservation wages, wil1  lower
the wage offers, but not the leve1 of unemployment. These results are not robust
over al1 possible models and parameter values, but it seems unwise to ignore the
effect of changes  in the leve1 of benefits on wage offers.
Because in equilibrium search models frictions confer some monopsony power
on employers, the effect of a change in the minimum wage may  differ markedly
from that in the standard competitive  model. In the simplest model a moderate
increase of the minimum wage raises the average  wage offer, but bas  no effect on
unemployment. In a model where individuals differ in the value that they attach  to
unemployment income, a increase in the minimum wage may reduce unemployment,
because the higher average  wage offer makes  more individuals willing to work. In
a model where jobs have different levels of productivity the minimum wage may
destroy jobs, because some activities may become unprofitable. Equilibrium search
models are sufficiently rich to allow for al1 possibilities, and the question which
situation applies can  be resolved by empirical research. It is hardly surprising that
Card and Krueger (1995) in th .eir controversial study of the effect of the minimum
wage on employment mention  equilibrium search models as a possible explanation
for their results.
The simplest equilibrium search models depend  on a few parameters that de-
termine the joint distribution of unemployment spells, job spells, and wages. In
this study we use aggregate data to estimate these key parameters for five OECD
countries: (West-)Germany, The Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom  and the
USA. We show that in the simple model only information on the marginal distri-
bution of wages and the marginal distributions of unemployment and job spells
is needed to estimate the structural parameters. Thus, the methodological contri-
bution of this paper is the demonstration that the model can  be calibrated from
readily available aggregate data, and that panel data on individuals are not nec-
essary. Our estimation method provides  a direct link between types of information
and parameters. For example, we shall show that data on job durations allow US
to estimate an index of the search frictions, without the need to estimate the other
parameters simultaneously. The parameters, the arrival rate  of wage offers, the rate
of job destruction, the average  productivity of jobs, and the variation of job produc-
tivities are of interest in their own right. We shall also  use the parameter estimates
to obtain estimates of structural unemployment due to wage floors, of the average
leve1 of monopsony power in the economy,  and to make a decomposition of wage
variation into variation due to productive  differences between jobs and variation
due to search frictions.
The estimation results are reported in section  5. In section  2 we introduce the
equilibrium search model that we use to obtain these results. The estimation pro-
cedure is described in section  3, and section  4 discusses  the data. Section 6 contains
some conclusions and questions for further research.
2 The Burdett-Mortensen equilibrium search model
As noted, there are several models for search markets  (see Ridder and Van den
Berg (1996) for a review). Our starting point is the equilibrium search model of
Burdett and Mortensen (Burdett and Mortensen (1996),  Mortensen (1990)). This
model has a dispersed wage offer distribution as an equilibrium outcome, even if al1
workers and firms are identical. Moreover, it allows for job-to-job  transitions, which
can  not occur in some other equilibrium search models. The model gives explicit
solutions for the wage offer distribution and the distribution of wages paid in a
cross-section of employees, and it specifies  al1 relevant transition intensities up to a
vector of parameters. For our purposes, it is important that the equilibrium solution
is such  that the parameters of the joint distribution of wages and unemployment
and job spells can  be identified from the implied marginal distributions of wages
and job/unemployment durations. This allows US to use aggregate data on wages
and unemployment/job durations that are available for a number of countries, to
estimate the parameters of the equilibrium search model.
First, we introduce the Burdett-Mortensen model with identical workers and
firms. Next, we extend the basic  model by allowing for differences in productivity
between workers and firms.
2.1 The basic  model: homogeneous workers and firms
We consider a labor market consisting of a continuurn of workers and firms. Firms set
wages and unemployed and employed workers search among firms. The unemployed
are looking for an acceptable  job, the employed for a better job. Jobs do not last
forever, but terminate at an exogenous rate. Firms compete  for employees, and set
their wage taking account of the wages offered by.  other firms and the acceptance
strategies of the (un)employed. Workers use the resulting wage offer distribution
to determine their acceptance strategies. In such  a labor market, there are flows
of workers who change jobs, who  iind a job from unemployment, and who become
unemployed. In a steady state the flows to and from the stocks of individuals in a
particular labor market position are equal. We assume that the labor market is in
this steady state. The model does not consider how  this steady state  is reached.
We use the following notation:
XO
X1
6
W
P
b
m
k4
Ww)
r
arrival rate  of job offers while unemployed
arrival rate  of job offers while employed
rate  at which jobs terminate
wage rate
marginal value product of employee
value of leisure (which, among other things, depends on unemployment benefits
number (measure)  of workers
number (measure) of the unemployed
distribution function of wage offer distribution
distribution function of earnings distribution
reservation wage of unemployed job seekers
The distribution functions F and G have the usual properties: they are right-
continuous. The left-hand limit of F at w is denoted by F(w-).  Initially, we allow
for discontinuities in F, i.e. there may be wages with F(w) - F(w-)  > 0. This is
important, because we must entertain the possibility that the wage offer distribution
is degenerate. The wage offer distribution is the distribution of the wage offers made
to employed and unemployed workers. The earnings distribution is the distribution
of wages paid to a cross-section of employees at a particular moment. To derive the
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equilibrium of the model we must consider the behavior of the suppliers of labor,
i.e. the unemployed and employed individuals, and of the employers. This behavior,
and the constraints imposed by the lags in the arrival of information, determine the
flows between labor market positions.
First, we consider the workers. The unemployed obtain wage offers from F(w)
at an exogenous rate  Xc.  The optimal acceptance strategy maximizes the expected
wealth of the unemployed. It is characterized by a reservation wage T (Mortensen
and Neumann  (1988))
J Cor = b + (Ao  - AI) 1 - F(w)r 6 + X1(1  - F(w))~~ (2.1)
This reservation wage takes account of search on the accepted job. As a result,  it
depends on the differente  between the arrival rates  while unemployed and employed.
In particular, the reservation wage is equal to the value of leisure if the arrival rates
are equal. The unemployed may  accept offers below b if Xi > Xc.  Here and in the
sequel, we assume that future income  is not discounted. A comparison of equation
(2.1) with the usual expression for the reservation wage in the infinite horizon case,
shows that wage offers are implicitly discounted at a rate  6 + X1(1  - F(w)), which
is the job-leaving rate  as we shall see shortly.
The acceptance strategy of the employed workers is simple. They accept any
wage offer, that exceeds their current wage. We assume that job-to-job transitions
are costless.
Next, we consider the flows of workers, that result  from these acceptance strate-
gies. The flow from unemployment to employment is &(l  - F(r-))u,  the product
of the offer arrival rate,  the acceptance probability, and the measure of unemployed
workers. The flow from employment to unemployment is a(m - u). In a steady state
these flows are equal and the resulting measure of -unemployed workers is
u = 6 + A,,(l:  F(w)) (2.2)
Let the distribution of wages paid to a cross-section of employees have distri-
bution function G. The wages paid to a cross-section of employees are on average
higher than the wages offered, because of the flow of employees to higher paying
jobs. Consider the stock of employees with a wage less or  equal to w, which has mea-
sure G(w)(m - u). In the steady-state  the flows into and from this stock are equal,
and this equality gives a relation between the wage offer and earnings distributions.
The flow into this group consists of the unemployed that accept a wage less than or
equal to w, and this flow is equal to Xo(F(w)  - F(r-))u  if w 2 T and is 0 otherwise.
The flow out  of this group consists of those who  become unemployed, aG(w)(m  - u)
and those who  receive  a job offer that exceeds w, X1(1  - F(w))G(w)(m  - u).  In a
steady state  the inflow and outflow are equal, and we can  express G as a function
of F
G(w)  = F(w) - F(r-) 5
1 - F(v) 6 +X1(1  - F(w)) (2.3)
where  we have substituted for u from equation (2.2). This equation holds  if w 2 r,
and G(w) = 0 otherwise. Note that if jobs last forever, i.e. 6 = 0, the steady-state
unemployment rate  is 0, and transitions to higher paying jobs would continue until
al1 workers have a wage equal to p.  In the sequel we only consider the case that
6 > 0.
From the two wage distributions we derive the supply of labor to an employer
that offers wage w. There are (G(w) - G( w - h))(  m- U) employees that earn a wage
in the interval (w - h,  w] and there are F(w) - F(w - h)  employers that offer a wage
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in that interval. Because firms that offer the same wage have the same steady-state
employment level, the supply of labor to a firm that offers w is obtained by dividing
the number of employees by the number of firms and letting h approach 0. This
supply is denoted by I(w 1 T,  F) w h ere we explicitly indicate  its dependence  on the
acceptance strategy of the unemployed and the wages offered by other firms that
compete  for the same workers.
I(w 1 r, F) = lim
(G(w) - G(w - h))(m  - u)
h-0 F ( w )  - F ( w  - h )
mdXo(l+X1(l-P(r-))
=
a+xo(l-F(v))
(6 + X1(1  - F(w)))(6  + X1(1  - F(w-))) ’ for w  z T
= 0 , for w < r
Note that it is allowed that a positive measure of employers offers wage w. It is
easily seen that 1 increases in w. Due to search frictions and competition for workers
employers face an upward sloping supply curve for labor with a finite wage elasticity.
If F is differentiable at w, this elasticity is proportional to the fraction  job leavers,
that leave for a higher paying job and the measure of firms that pay  a comparable
wage. The supply function is discontinuous at points of discontinuity of F.
Finally, we consider optimal wage setting by the employer. We assume that
the marginal value product p does not depend  on the number of employees, i.e. we
assume that the production function is linear in employment. In that case the profit
flow of the firm that pays wage w is (p - w)l(w 1 r,  F). The wage offer of the firm
maximizes  this profit  flow
w = argmax[(p  - s)l(s  1 r, F)]
5 (2.5)
We make the implicit  assumption, that the firm is only interested in the steady
state  profit  flow. Hence, in setting its wage the firm does not try to smooth its
leve1 of employment in response to short run random  fluctuations in the leve1  of
employment. Because al1 workers and al1 firms are identical, each  worker is equally
productive  at each  firm. This completes our description of the search market.
Next, we characterize equilibrium in this search market. Because firms that offer
wages that are strictly smaller than T have no employees and 0 profits, while a firm
that offers T has strictly positive profits, we have F(r-)  = 0, i.e. there are no wage
offers below T.  Because firms, that offer a wage equal to p have 0 profits, and again
a firm that offers T has strictly positive profits, wage offers are bounded above by p.
The fact  that the profit  per employee p - w is continuous in 20,  puts restrictions on
the equilibrium wage offer distribution. For let w be offered by a positive measure
of firms, i.e  F(w) - F(w-)  > 0. Then /(zo+) - I(w-) > 0, i.e. there is a positive
measure of workers employed at wage w. If one of the firms that offer w increases its
wage offer by a smal1 amount, it wil1 eventually attract al1 the workers employed at
firms with wage offer w. Because the profit  per employee is continuous in w, the firm
increases its profit  rate  by [I(w+)  - I(w-)]w > 0. H ence, competition for employees
eliminates the discontinuities in the wage offer distribution. An equilibrium wage
offer distribution bas  no mass points, and in particular, it can  not be degenerate.
We have already  noted, that we also  need 6 > 0 to preclude  that the wage offer
distribution is degenerate at p.
The wage offers also  are a connected set. For firms that offer a wage at the upper
bound of a gap in the set of wage offers, can  lower their wage to the lower bound of
the gap without losing any  employees, because 1 is constant, if F does not change
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with w. In doing so they increase their profits. Hence, profit  maximization eliminates
the gaps in the set of wage offers. As a consequente  F is strictly increasing for al1
wage offers. Finally, we derive an expression for F. In equilibrium, firms have no
incentive to change their wage offer. This implies, that al1 wage offers must give the
same profit  flow ‘IT.  We already  know, that the lowest wage offer is equal to T.  Firms
that offer T only attract unemployed workers. Their profits are equal to
a = (p - r)l(r  1 r,F)  =
m6Xo P-r
(6  + Ao)(6  + Al)  (6 + h(l  - F(w)))~
(2.6)
Hence, this equation expresses the common profit  rate  as a function of the arrival
rates, p and r. Al1 equilibrium wage offers yield the same profit  rate  a
dAo(6  + AI)
6 + x0 (6 + X1(1  ! F(w)))~ (2.7)
Substituting for ?r  from equation (2.6) we can  solve for F
GW
This expression holds  for al1 equilibrium wage offers. The lowest wage offer is r. By
setting F equal to 1 we obtain the highest offer ïü
z= ($g2”  (l-  (2TJ2)p (2.9)
Of course, F(w) is 0 for w < r and 1 for w > ïü.  Note that F is differentiable. The
density function is
f(w) =
6+X1  1
-
2hJp=-r dp’;-w
,for  r < w < ü7
(2.10)
= 0 otherwise
We substitute the equilibrium wage offer distribution in equations (2.1),  (2.2),
(2.3),and  (2.4) to obtain the equilibriumreservation wage, unemployment rate, earn-
ings distribution and employment.
r = (6  + Vb  + (Xo  - h)XlP
(~+V+(Xo  - X1)X1
(2.11)
(2.12)
, forr<w<F (2.13)
6fi 1
g(w) = -
2 x 1 (p - w)S
, forr<w<ïü
m6Xo
i(wIr,F) = (6+xo)(a+Al)~~~ > forr<w<E (2.15)
The model has dispersed equilibrium wage offer and earnings distributions. Be-
cause  al1 workers and firms are identical, this implies that the law of one price does
not hold in equilibrium. However,  we obtain the competitive  equilibrium, in which
al1 wages are equal to p,  and the monopsonistic equilibrium, in which al1 wages are
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equal to b, as limits of the equilibrium solution. If Xc  approaches oo,  i.e. if the un-
employed find jobs instantaneously, then the wage offer and earnings distributions
degenerate in p. If Ai approaches 0, i.e. if the employed do not receive  alternative
job offers, then the distributions degenerate at b. For S > 0 the maximum offer W
is strictly smaller than p, but for X1  > 0 it is also  strictly larger than b. Hence, the
equilibrium offers are those of firms that have a finitely elastic  labor supply. This is
confirmed by the wage elasticity of I(w 1 r, F), which is equal to (p - w)/w,  as it is
for a monopsonistic firm.
The basic  equilibrium search model is a highly stylized model with strong impli-
cations for the distribution of unemployment and job spells. Are these predictions
consistent with empirical evidente?  Of course, not much should be expected from
a model that assumes that al1 workers and firms are identical. In equilibrium the
lowest wage offer is equal to the reservation wage of the unemployed. Hence, al1 job
offers are acceptable  to the unemployed, and the re-employment hazard is equal to
the offer arrival rate. This is consistent with the empirical evidente  in e.g. Devine
and Kiefer (1991) and and Van den Berg (1990). Although job search models origi-
nally were introduced  as a potential explanation for the existente  of unemployment,
most empirical studies find that rejection of job offers is rare. In the basic  model
equilibrium unemployment is due to lags in the arrival of job offers. The homo-
geneous  model does not allow for structural unemployment. The rate  at which
job spells end, decreases with the wage. This is consistent with empirical evidente
(Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1991)). In equilibrium there is a positive association
between firm size  and wage. Hence, the model is consistent with the employer size
wage effect.
The wage offer and earnings distributions have an increasing density. In figure
2.1 these densities are drawn.
0 1000 1200 1400 1600 1600 2000 - 2200
b w
w
Figure 2.1: Earnings and wage offer density; Xs  = X1  = .047,6  = .025, b = 1192,p =
2208
Observed distributions of wages do not resemble this earnings distribution. In par-
ticular, they do not have an increasing density. As shown in Ridder and Van den
Berg (1996),  11a owing for heterogeneity in p improves the fit to observed wages dra-
matically, and we use such  an extension of the basic  model to obtain our estimates.
There are empirical results that the model can  not describe. In labor economics
there bas  been a lively debate on the positive relation between wages and labor
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market experience. Although the debate is stil1 active, the available evidente  sug-
gests, that wage growth is due to both wage growth on the job and wage increases
that are associated with transitions from lower to higher paying jobs (Abraham
and Farber (1987),  Altonji and Shakatko (1987),  Topel (1991),  Wolpin (1994)). The
present model only allows for the second type of wage growth. Attempts have been
made to construct an equilibrium search model in which firms offer a wage path,
but thus far the resulting models are unappealing from an empirical viewpoint, be-
cause  they do not allow for direct job-to-job transitions, and as a consequente  have
counterfactual implications for the relation between wages and firm size (Coles and
Burdett (1992).
2.2 The minimum wage and heterogeneity in p
We consider two extensions of the basic  model. First, we allow for a minimum wage
WL.  Next,  we introduce heterogeneity in productivity. If the minimum wage is lower
than the reservation wage of the unemployed, then it does not affect the equilibrium
solution of the model. If it exceeds this reservation wage, than the lowest wage offer
is equal to the minimum wage. The maximum offer is as in equation (2.9) with the
reservation wage r replaced by the minimum wage WL.  With a binding minimum
wage the equilibrium is independent of the leve1 of unemployment income  b. Hence,
the equilibrium depends either on b or on WL  but not on both.
As long as the minimum wage is lower than p, the leve1 of unemployment is
independent of the leve1 of the minimum wage. An increase in the minimum wage
lowers the profits of the employers and raises the income  of the workers. If the
minimum wage exceeds the productivity p,  firms wil1 close, and al1 workers become
permanently unemployed.
Although we could let al1 parameters vary in the population, we choose to have
heterogeneity in p.  As argued in Ridder and Van den Berg (1996),  heterogeneity in
p is essential to obtain an acceptable  fit to the observed wage distribution. The fit
to the duration data is also  improved. We can  distinguish between within-market
and between-market heterogeneity in p.  In the first case, we consider a single or
a few markets,  in which firms with different levels of productivity coexist. This
alters the equilibrium solution. Here, we consider the second case, in which we
have a large number, in the sequel we assume a continuum, of markets,  each  with
its productivity leve1 p. In each  market, the equilibrium is as in the basic  model.
With between-market heterogeneity it does not matter whether we associate  the
productivity with the worker or  with the firm. We shall not relate  the productivity
to characteristics of workers and/or  firms. Our aggregate data do not allow US to
make distinctions. Instead, we assume that p has some distribution with p.d.f. h
and c.d.f. H.
Although between-market heterogeneity in p does not alter  the equilibrium so-
lution, it enriches the model by adding the possibility of structural unemployment.
If p < muz(w~,  b), then the firms in the corresponding market close down, and the
workers become unemployed. If the measure of the affected  workers is h(p)mdp,
then the unemployment rate  is equal to
21
- = &(l - H(w))  + H(w)m
(2.16)
The first term on the right-hand side  of this equation reflects frictional unemploy-
ment and the second-term structural unemployment. A further distinction could be
made between voluntary and involuntary (structural) unemployment, but because
the data wil1  not allow US to make this distinction, this is of little importante.
8
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3 Inference
The equilibrium search model with between-market heterogeneity in p specifies  the
joint distribution of wages and unemployment and job spells. Panel data, in which
individuals are followed during some period, contain the required information. Rid-
der and Van den Berg (1996) d’ISCUSS  the estimation of the model with panel data.
Here we use aggregate data to estimate the parameters of the model. The advantage
of aggregate data is that they are available for a larger number of countries and for
more years. However,  aggregate data on the joint distribution of wages and spells
are not available. The data that are available refer to the marginal distributions of
wages and unemployment and job spells.
Fortunately, al1 parameters can  be identified from the marginal distributions.
The basic  model implies that the marginal distribution of unemployment spells tc
is exponential with parameter X0. Hence, the average  length of an unemployment
spel1 is $. To obtain the marginal distribution of job spells tr,  we note that upon
substitutfon  of equation (2.8) in the job-leaving rate  we obtain
If we integrate with respect to the density of earnings of equation (2.14),  we obtain
the marginal density of tl
6(X1  + 6) x1+6
W)  = x1
/6
z exp(-zti)$dr
This is a mixture  of exponentials with a fully  specified  mixing distribution with
bounded support. Note that this distribution does not depend on p.  Hence, we
obtain the same marginal distribution of job spells, irrespective of the assumed
distribution of p. The average  job spel1 is
E(tl) =
x1 + 26
26(X1  + 6) (3.3)
In theory, we can  recover  Xc,  Ai and 6 from the marginal distributions of to and
tl. Because for some countries we only have the average  spel1 lengths, we can  only
identify two parameters. For that reason we assume in the sequel that
x0 = x1 = x (3.4)
In words, we assume that the offer arrival rate  is the same when employed or
unemployed. This implies that the reservation wage r is equal to unemployment
income  b  (see equation (2.1)). 1 n an  empirical study with individual panel data we
found that the two arrival rates  do not differ by much (Koning, Ridder, and Van
den Berg (1995)).
The marginal distribution of wages in a cross-section of employees is obtained
by integration of the density in equation (2.14) with respect to the density of p
truncated at maz(b,  WL).  The mean  and variante  of this distribution are
and
E(w) =u+ &(PT - 4 (3.5)
with PT  and C$ the mean  and variante  of the distribution of p truncated at - =
 TUL).
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Table 4.1: Average,  standard deviation of monthly wage and minimum wage in local
currency 1990/1991
Table 5.1: Ofler  arrival rate and job destruction rate  per month
/ NL D F UK U S A
A 1 .162 .147 .143 ,195 .316
5 1 .00591 .00360 .00376  .00534  .00616
intervals. For the USA the estimate is obtained from the reported average  spel1
length. The estimates of 6 are obtained by maximum likelihood. The likelihood
takes account of the length bias  in the stock sample.
The US has the largest offer arrival rate  and also  the largest job destruction rate.
The next largest arrival rate  is that of the UK. However,  the job destruction rate  is
larger in The Netherlands. It is almost  as large as that in the US. The offer arrival
rate  and job destruction rates  are the smallest  in France and Western-Germany.
From the estimates we obtain a decomposition of the observed unemployment
rate  into a frictional and structural component. Note that structural unemploy-
ment is due to a wage floor, which is equal to maz(b,  tuk). For the computation of
the structural component of the unemployment rate, it does not matter which is
larger. The frictional rate  is highest in The Netherlands and lowest in the US. The
structural rate  is highest in France and the UK, and relatively smal1 in Western-
Germany.
Finally, we estimate the mean  and standard deviation of the productivity distri-
bution in active markets.  We use these estimates to compute  an average  monopsony
index
Table 5.2: Unemployment rate:  frictional and structural
INL D F U K  U S A
Unempl. rate 1 .075 .049 .094 .087 .066
Frictional .034 .023 .024 .025 .018
Structural I .041 .026 .070 ,062 .048
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Table 5.3: Mean  and standard deviation of productivity in active  markets  (national
currency), average  monopsony index, and decomposition of wage variation
NL D F U K  U S A
PT 3890 4125 8436 1264 1430
UT 1539 1658 3763 593
Monopsony index .017 .012 ,018 .018 .0098
Frac. var. due to p .94 .98 .97 .97
Monopsony index, u!  = 0 .035 .024 .026 .027 ,019
Frac. var. due to - = 0p, .79 .90 .95 .61
PT - E(w)
(5.1)
PT
and a decomposition of the wage variante  into a component due to heterogeneity in
p and a component due to search frictions. These quantities do not depend on the
currency. We assume that the lowest wage is equal to the minimum wage, except
for the UK. The lowest monthly wage is set equal to 400 for the UK.
The results show that the search frictions do not give a substantial monopsony
power to the employers. They are only able to set the average  wage about 1.5 per
cent lower than the competitive wage. This is a direct consequente  of the relative
size  of arrival rate  and the job destruction rate. -The  ratio of J and b  is the ex-
pected number of job offers during an employment spell, which is an index of the
search frictions in the market. The larger this index, the smaller the frictions. The
monopsony index decreases in the wage floor. We also  report the index for a wage
floor equal to 0. The the role of search frictions in explaining wages is limited. The
fraction  explained by search frictions increases if the wage floor decreases. Again
we report the upper bound. In particular, in The Netherlands and in the UK wage
floors keep the market equilibrium close to the competitive equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
This paper is a first attempt  to use aggregate data to estimate the key parameters
of a simple equilibrium search model. The estimates suggest, that the equilibrium in
the five labor markets  under consideration is not far from the competitive outcome,
at least for the employed. Wage floors play a role in keeping the equilibrium close
to the competitive outcome. However,  these wage floors also  lead to structural
unemployment .
The model is simple. In particular, the assumed equality of the offer arrival rate
in unemployment and employment may give an underestimate of the job destruction
rate, and hence an underestimate of the leve1 of frictional unemployment, and the
monopsony index. Data on employment spells, in addition to data on job spells,
would allow US to investigate this.
12
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